THE WEAKEST LINK HYPOTHESIS FOR ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: AN EMPIRICAL TEST by Richard S.J. Tol & Gary W. Yohe
























Department of Economics 
Public Affairs Center 
238 Church Street 
Middletown, CT 06459-007 
 
Tel: (860) 685-2340 
Fax: (860) 685-2301 
http://www.wesleyan.edu/econ 
THE WEAKEST LINK HYPOTHESIS FOR ADAPTIVE 
CAPACITY: AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
 
Richard S.J. Tol and Gary W. Yohe 
 
January 24, 2006 




a,b,c and Gary W. Yohe
d 
 
a Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University and Centre for 
Marine and Atmospheric Science, Hamburg, Germany 
b Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
c Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 
USA 
d John E. Andrus Professor of Economics, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT, USA  06459 
 
 




Yohe and Tol (2001) built an indexing method for vulnerability based on the hypothesis that 
the adaptive capacity for any system facing a vector of external stresses could be explained by 
the weakest of eight underlying determinants – the so-called “weakest link” hypothesis.  
Subsequent work supported the hypothesis by analogy from other contexts, but we now offer 
perhaps the first attempt to explore its validity through empirical means.  We estimate a 
structural form designed to accommodate the full range of possible interactions across 
determinants.  The perfect complement case of the pure “weakest-link” formulation lies on 
one extreme, and the perfect substitute case where each determinant can compensate for all 
others at constant rates is the other limiting case.  For vulnerability to natural disasters, infant 
mortality and drinking water treatment, we find qualified support for a modified weakest link 
hypothesis: the weakest indicator plays an important role, but is not essential because other 
factors can compensate (with increasing difficulty).  For life expectancy, sanitation and 
nutrition, we find a relationship that is close to linear – the perfect substitute case where the 
various determinants of adaptive capacity can compensate for each other.  Moreover, we find 
another source of diversity in the assessment of vulnerability, since the factors from which 
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JEL Classification 
Q0; O2 1. Introduction 
 
Some of the factors that define the vulnerability of any human system are defined by the 
physical properties of its environment, but other factors are framed by social-economic 
context and social preferences.  Smit, et al. (IPCC, Chapter 18, 2001) noted this distinction, 
but they ultimately argued that it was irrelevant.  Regardless of whether physical or social 
factors were in play, they saw that any system’s vulnerability to any vector of external 
stresses is determined fundamentally by its exposure to the manifestations of those stresses 
and its baseline sensitivity to those manifestations.  Moreover, any system’s ability to cope 
with exposure and/or sensitivity depends, in turn, on the degree to which it can exploit its 
innate (or developed) adaptive capacity.  In the IPCC view of adaptation, then, all three of 
these factors work together to define social-economic thresholds of tolerance to external 
stresses (of which climate change and climate variability may be two of many) in ways that 
are clearly path dependent and site specific.   
 
To sort through the implications of this insight across a diverse globe, Yohe and Tol (2001) 
suggested focusing attention on a list of underlying determinants for adaptive capacity: 
 
1.  the range of available technological options for adaptation, 
 
2.  the availability of resources and their distribution across the population, 
 
3.  the structure of critical institutions, the derivative allocation of decision-
making authority, and the decision criteria that would be employed, 
 
4.  the stock of human capital including education and personal security, 
 
5.  the stock of social capital including the definition of property rights, 
 
6.  the system’s access to risk spreading processes, 
 
7.  the ability of decision-makers to manage information, the processes by 
which these decision-makers determine which information is credible, and 
the credibility of the decision-makers, themselves, and 
 
8.  the public’s perceived attribution of the source of stress and the 
significance of exposure to its local manifestations. 
 
Indeed, Yohe and Tol conjectured that the adaptive capacity of any system would, for all 
intents and purposes, be limited by the weakest of these underlying determinants; this is the 
so-called “weakest link” hypothesis with which they constructed an indexing scheme by 
which the relative vulnerabilities of wildly different systems could be judged.   
 
Some additional effort has been devoted to exploring the validity of this hypothesis over the 
past few years, but empirical validation of the sort reported here has not yet been attempted.  
Before turning to that task, however, we offer a brief review of this more recent work in 
Section 1.  We highlight not only emerging support for the “weakest link” approach from a 
variety of contexts, but also an alternative view which admits to the possibility that strength in 
one determinant could be exploited to compensate, at least to some degree, for weakness in 
another.  Informed by the possibility that this sort of compensation might ameliorate the 
power of the “weakest link” hypothesis, we designed a structural model through which we can estimate the degree to which the various determinants of adaptive capacity might compensate 
(i.e., substitute) for one another.  We elaborate its details in Section 2 before describing our 
data Section 3.  Results are described in Section 4, and concluding remarks offer thoughts 
about context, applicability, and next steps.  
 
 
2.  Support for the “Weakest Link”. 
 
Adger and Vincent (2004) confronted the likely diversity of context that the IPCC noted by 
arguing that adaptive capacity essentially describes the adaptation space within which 
decision-makers in any system (regardless of location or state of development) might find 
feasible adaptation options.  They argued that recognizing diversity makes it easier to 
anticipate changes in generic adaptive capacity than it is to foresee changes in adaptation, per 
se.  As a result, linking the determinants of adaptive capacity to available response (i.e., 
policy) levers can help explain why certain responses to fundamental identical stressors work 
sometimes in some places, but not at other times in other places.  Their insights therefore 
conformed well with the “weakest link” conjecture. 
 
Meanwhile, the hypothesis that a systems capacity to function well depends on the weakest of 
a list of underlying building blocks makes perfect sense to economists who have long 
understood that the efficiency (and perhaps even the existence) of economic markets can be 
undermined if any one of a long list of primary conditions is not satisfied.  Participants must 
be rational (determinant #4 above).  Property rights must be well defined (#5) and participants 
must have access to the economic value of their endowments (#2).  Complete information 
must be widely available and relatively inexpensive (if not free), and it must be perceived to 
be reliable by all participants (#8).  Individuals and firms should have access to insurance 
mechanisms in the face of non-diversifiable risk (#6), and neither asymmetric information nor 
market power can distort behavior (#3 and #7).  
 
Support for the hypothesis from the economics literature was, however, not confined to 
theoretical discussions of hypothetical efficiency or ruminations that focused exclusively on 
climate change.  The factors that determine a country’s ability to advance its development 
plans were also seen to coincide with the factors that influence adaptive capacity listed above.  
Moreover, the uneven success (or failure) of comparable economic policies in various 
countries noted by Adger and Vincent can be explained to a large measure by variants of the 
“weakest link” theme.  For example, the match between the list of characteristics upon which 
success in promoting long-term growth, site-specific productivity gains, or improved equity 
and the determinants of adaptive capacity is quite strong.  Both include references to strong 
and skilled governance (determinant #7), appropriate distributions of resources and access to 
resources (#2), strong stocks of human capital (#5), and overall stability (#5).  Whether or not 
the links between an economic intervention (or an adaptation) and its desired outcomes are 
strong, weak, or actually run in a direction that is opposite to that predicted by theory or 
process analysis is essentially an empirical question in nearly every instance.  A brief review 
of some very recent literature is sufficient to make this point.   
   
Lucas (1988) has argued that human capital externalities (determinant #4) are large enough to 
explain differences between the long-run growth rates of poor and rich countries.  Guiso, et al. 
(2004) expanded the scope of analysis when they explored the role of social capital (#5) in 
supporting successful application of financial structures; they found that social capital matters 
most when education levels are low and law enforcement is weak.  Meanwhile, Rozelle and 
Swinnen (2004) looked across transition countries across central Europe and the former Soviet Union and observed that countries which grew steadily a decade or more after their 
reforms have managed to create macroeconomic stability (#6 and #7), reform property rights 
(#5), harden budget constraints, and create institutions that facilitate exchange and develop an 
environment within which contracts can be enforced and new firms can enter (#5 and #7).  
Order and timing did not matter, but success depended upon on meeting all of these 
underlying objectives.  Winters, et al. (2004) reviewed a long literature to conclude that the 
ability of trade liberalization to reduce poverty depends on the existence and stability of 
markets (#5), on the ability of actors to handle changes in risk (#6), on access to technology 
and resources (#2), on competent and honest government (#5 and #7), and on policies that 
promote conflict resolution and promote human capital accumulation (#4); shortfalls in any of 
these underpinnings makes it extremely difficult for the gains to trade to reach the most 
disadvantaged citizens.   Finally, Sala-i-Martin, et al. (2004) applied new Bayesian estimation 
techniques to popular data to find robust power in explaining economic growth residing in a 
nation’s level of participation in primary school education (human capital), other measures of 
human capital (#4; e.g., health measures), the relative prices of investment goods (#1; 
available options), and the initial level of per capita income (#2; access to resources); 
interestingly, though, they find that public consumption and, in some cases, public investment 
are negatively correlated to growth (#7; deficiency in governance determinants).  
 
To explore its robustness beyond the realm of the economic paradigm, Yohe and Ebi (2005) 
observed that the public health sector works under the presumption that the ability to 
influence a public health problem (i.e., to adapt to a perceived level of vulnerability) depends 
on a number of factors that are also path dependent and site specific and that it recognizes the 
validity of a weakest link approach.  Indeed, the health sector generally expects that its efforts 
will be futile if any of the following “prerequisites for prevention” are missing: 
1.  An awareness that a problem exists (determinant #8); 
2.  A sense that the problem matters (#7 and # 8); 
3.  Understanding of what causes the problem (#4, # 5 and #7); 
4.  Capability to intervene (#1, # 2 and #6); and 
5.  Political will to influence the problem (#3, #4 and #5). 
It is not difficult to see that this list of prerequisites map well into the determinants of adaptive 
capacity listed earlier.  The matches are not exact, of course, because the scales at which risks 
can be spread vary by health outcome and by disease determinant.  Nonetheless, experience in 
the public health context offers evidence the list of determinants recorded above is workable, 
especially with its emphasis on public infrastructure (governance, social capital), human 
capital (education and behavior) and the ability to manage information.   
 
Notwithstanding the commonality of critical determinants for capacities of systems to cope 
with a growing list of stresses in pursuit of a diverse range of objectives, other lines of 
research in multivariate contexts suggests that, although a configuration of variables may be 
necessary to produce an effect, many such configurations may suffice.  There may be a core 
set of determinants across a multitude of settings for which a “weakest link” hypothesis might 
apply, but it can be hard in practice to identify all of the relevant factors much less what might 
be the “weakest link.”  In some situations, for instance, aggressive leadership might more than 
compensate for weaknesses (or strengths, in the case of destructive leadership) elsewhere in 
the social fabric. 
 
The economics literature again provides a perfect illustration – this time of the notion of 
compensation.  Williamson (2005) reflected on a lifetime of work in which he tried to explain diversity in the structure of firms across developed economies.  In his work, the primary 
driver of how firms would organize themselves was their desire to maximize their ability to 
adapt to external stress.  He ultimately saw three possibilities for which governance patterns 
could be described in terms of differential incentive intensity, differential administrative 
control, and differential reliance on background regime that set the rules for contract law.  At 
one extreme, firms would find it in their best interest to rely on autonomous adaptations in 
circumstances if they operated within strong market structures (see above) that could sustain 
strong reliance on “high-powered” incentives (in lieu of elaborate administrative 
mechanisms); these markets would, of course, have to be supported by a well understood 
legal-rules contract-law regimes.  While these firms would find themselves well suited to 
respond individually to external stress, they would find it difficult to sustain cooperative 
adaptations difficult.  No matter, though; such arrangements would be unnecessary given the 
underlying legal structure. 
 
Williamson sees hierarchies (organizational structures built around significant administrative 
control perhaps through vertical integration) at the other extreme.  These firms would 
discover the largest adaptive capacity under conditions where the legal system was 
“deferential” so that incentive contracts could not be efficiently administered.  They would, 
therefore, find it necessary to create and maintain cooperative adaptive options even if that 
meant doing it all themselves.  In between, hybrid structures would evolve.  They would 
assume selected and advantageous characteristics of both extremes depending on the “efficacy 
of credible commitments” (i.e., penalties for premature termination, information disclosure, 
verification mechanisms, specialized dispute settlement, etc….components of the list of 
determinants provided above).  Put another way and regardless of which structure emerges 
from which context, Williamson argues that firms organize themselves in ways that maximize 
their adaptive capacities by compensating for deficiencies in the underlying determinants 
provided by their economic environments.   
 
Brenkert and Malone (2005) formalized the notion of compensation in their analysis of 
vulnerability and resilience to climate change in India.  Following the lead of Moss et al. 
(2001), they created indices from a set of underlying determinants for coping capacity and 
sensitivity.  More specifically, their index for coping capacity was supported as the geometric 
mean of two components of economic capacity (GDP per capita and income distribution 
equity), two components of human and civic resources (percent of the population in the 
workforce and an illiteracy rate) and three components of environmental capacity (percent of 
non-managed land, sulfur dioxide emissions, and population density); and their overall index 
was the arithmetic mean of this index and a corresponding index of sensitivity drawn from 
settlement infrastructure, food security, human health, ecosystem management, and the 
availability of water resources.  As such, they recognized the potential of some degree of 
compensation within their measures coping capacity and sensitivity; and they asserted perfect 
compensating potential across those aggregates.  Their weights are ad hoc. 
 
 
3.  The Modelling Structure 
 
The vulnerability V of any country C to an external stress can be measured as 
 




where the Ai are indicators of n distinct determinants of adaptive capacity.  The αi and γ are 
parameters in the relationship that is motivated by the usual structure of constant elasticity of substitution production functions.  In this regard, (1/γ) is the “elasticity of substitution” 
between any two determinants in supporting the exercise of adaptive capacity in reducing 
vulnerability to the chosen stress.  It therefore reflects the sensitivity of the ratio of the 
“marginal products” of two determinants to changes in the ratio of their observed levels.  Put 
another way, (1/γ) reflect the sensitivity of the “marginal rate of substitution” between any 
two determinants to changes in their relative strengths.   
 
The parameter γ is of primary interest in examining the weakest link hypothesis.  To see why, 
notice that 
 
1.  γ = 0 would mean that {1/VC} ≡ {∑ αi Ai}.  In this case, the determinants of 
adaptive capacity would be perfect substitutes regardless of their individual 
levels.  In words, the determinants can substitute for one another at constant 
rates to maintain the same level of vulnerability.  
 
2.  γ → ∞ would mean that {1/VC} ≡ min{αi Ai}.  In this other extreme case, the 
determinants of adaptive capacity would be perfect complements and overall 
vulnerability would be entirely determined by the “weakest link” in the sense 
that strengthening any but the weakest determinant would do nothing to reduce 
vulnerability.  Put another way, increasing the strength of anything but the 
weakest determinant would do nothing to change vulnerability.  This is the 
Yohe and Tol (2001) structure in its purest form. 
 
3.  γ = 1 would means that {1/VC} ≡ {∏Ai
αi }.  This is a threshold case because, as 
γ converges to unity from above, the “iso-vulnerability” loci do not intersect any 
of the Ai = 0 axis.  It follows that vulnerability would be infinite if any single 
determinant were not present.  In all other cases, the determinants can substitute 
for one another to maintain the same level of vulnerability, but compensation 
would become increasingly expensive as strength in one or more determinants 
became weaker. This is nearly the functional form of the geometric mean 
employed by Brenkert and Malone (2005), although the geometric mean 
imposes the condition that all of the αi coefficients are identical. 
 
4.  γ < 1 would mean that the determinants can substitute for one another to 
maintain the same level of vulnerability and that compensation would become 
less expensive as strength in one or more determinants became weaker. 
 
Estimated values of γ between 0 and unity would therefore imply varying degrees of 
substitution between determinants as γ grows toward unity.  In other words, strength in one 
determinant could compensate, in terms of reducing vulnerability, for weakness in another 
regardless of the levels of underlying support distributed across the Ai (even if one or more, 
but not all, of the underlying determinants were zero).  Finite values above 1 would also show 
some but increasingly limited (again, as γ grows past unity) potential for substitution.  In any 
of these cases, though, substitution could never overcome a total shortcoming in one or more 
of the Ai. 
 
Figure 1 provides some insight into this structure by portraying “iso-vulnerability” loci for 
three values of γ (γ = 0.5, 0.9 and 1.1) for a simple case of two determinants with α1 = α2 = 1.  
These three cases straddle the boundary case where γ = 1so that the elasticity of substitution 
ranges from 2 on the high side to 0.91 on the low side.  Notice that the first case shows a locus 
that intersects both axes around Ai = 1; this is a case where a complete deficiency in one determinant can be overcome by relatively modest investment in the other (bringing the other 
up to around 4).  The intermediate case drawn there also allows for complete compensation, 
but the remaining determinant must be orders of magnitude higher than 4.  The locus for the 
other extreme case, where the elasticity of substitution is below unity, never comes close to 
either axis, so complete compensation is impossible. 
 
Table 1 defines some illustrative hypothetical cases across which this structure can be 
explored in a more complicated case.  Notice that five underlying determinants are considered 
and that the 11 cases span a range beginning with perfect equality across the Ai and ending 
with the possibility that one value is nearly zero.  All of the cases are symmetric in their 
distribution of relative strength, and the overall sum of the five Ai is always the same.  Table 2 
reports the corresponding vulnerability values for each case across a range of values for γ that 
straddle the unity threshold under the assumption that the αi are all equal to 0.2 (so they sum 
to unity).  Figure 2 portrays the results graphically.  The structure has the pleasing 
characteristic that all values of γ produce the same vulnerability value for the perfect equality 
of Case 1.  They all show increasing vulnerability as the distribution of the underlying 
determinants becomes more uneven, with higher values of γ showing the largest changes.  
Indeed, were Case 11 to allow A1 to fall to zero, then the vulnerability values for cases in 
which γ ≥ 1 would be undefined.  
 
The possibility that the strength of a determinant must exceed a specific threshold Ai
T can also 
be accommodated in this structure by defining  
 
(2a)    Bi ≡ {Ai - Ai
T} for Ai > Ai








would represent the relationship between “threshold constrained” determinants and 
vulnerability.  Notice that the discussion of ability of substitution to support the reduction of 
vulnerability would continue to hold, but the thresholds Ai
T would serve as boundaries for the 
“iso-vulnerability” loci for cases in which γ ≥ 1.  This possibility is displayed in Figure 3 – a 
replication of the simple illustration of Figure 1 with A1
T = A2
T = 0.1.  Notice, to clearly 
differentiate this case from the one displayed in Figure 1, that the γ = 0.5 locus converges to 
vertical and horizontal asymptotes defined by A1
T = A2
T = 0.1.  Note that we do not further 





We used six alternative indicators for vulnerability, four of which are in fact indicators for the 
absence of vulnerability.  The fraction of people affected by natural disasters was the first 
indicator that we explored.  The data are from EMDAT (2005).  We normalised their “number 
affected” with the size of the population.  We averaged over 1991-2000 to smooth interannual 
variations.  We aggregated all types of hazards, again to smooth variability, and we assumed 
that the data represent the hazard situation in 1995. 
 
The second indicator was infant mortality, taken from WRI (2005).  Infant mortality 
integrates a range of problems of poverty and health.  Although disease-specific (infant) 
mortality would be more informative, data coverage is insufficient, particularly in poorer countries.  The third indicator was life expectancy at birth, taken from WRI (2005); it is an 
indicator of invulnerability.  Life expectancy is related to infant mortality, but also includes 
health risks in later life.  We used data for 1995 where available and the average of 1992 and 
1997 otherwise. 
 
Nutrition reflected by the average calorie supply per person per day taken from WRI (2005) 
served as the fourth indicator.  Risk of hunger would have been a better indicator, but there 
are no such data available and the coverage of famines by EMDAT (2005) is sparse. The fifth 
indicator, the percentage of people with access to improved sanitation (pit latrines and better) 
from WRI (2005), has similar drawbacks.  We would have preferred to use an indicator of the 
problems caused by faulty sanitation, but this is not available.  We used the average of 1990 
and 2002, the only years for which data are available.  The percentage of people with access 
to an improved source of drinking water (rainfall collectors and better), again from WRI 
(2005), completed the list of indicators that we explored.  We used the average of 1990 and 
2002, the only years for which data are available.  Note that the last three are indicators of 
invulnerability. 
 
We grouped the indicators of adaptive capacity into five categories.  Table 3 lists them all. 
Political indicators include the nature of government (democracy etc.), and the nature of 
government intervention in society (rule of law etc.).  Cultural indicators include average 
attitudes (e.g., to risk).  Related to that, we included a list of dummies giving the dominant 
religion in a country; note that a country may be labelled “Christian” even though most of its 
inhabitants are secular.  Per capita income, income distribution, and poverty rates were 





5.1. Natural  disasters 
 
We began by trying to explain the number of people affected by natural disasters, per 
thousand people, per year, averaged over 1991-2000.  Two problems with estimating (1) 
quickly became apparent.  The first was model selection.  There were many potential 
indicators of adaptive capacity, each with missing observations for different countries.  
Furthermore, regressions are plagued by multicollinearity.  One would preferably start with 
the model that includes all possible explanatory variables.  Estimates could then be refined by 
eliminating variables that are neither individually nor jointly significant in a step-wise 
process.  This procedure was not possible, however, because all of the variables are actually 
available for only a small number of countries.  Indeed, this number is smaller than the 
number of potential explanatory variables.  We were therefore forced to group the explanatory 
variables; Table 3 provides the details.  For each group, therefore, we first included all 
variables in a linear model and then systematically reduced the model to include significant 
variables only.  Of the institutional variables, only economic freedom mattered; it increases 
vulnerability.  Of the religious variables, only Christianity and Islam had a significant effect 
on vulnerability; both reduce vulnerability.  Of the economic variables, absolute poverty and 
per capita income were individually significant, but not jointly; poverty increases 
vulnerability.  Of the cultural variables, only uncertainty avoidance mattered: it reduces 
vulnerability. Of the education variables, only enrolment in tertiary education was significant; 
it reduces vulnerability.  Significant explanatory variables per group were then combined in a 
new model, and the number of significant variables was further reduced.  In the end, only per 
capita income, uncertainty avoidance, and tertiary education were included.  
Non-linearity was the second problem in estimating equation (1).  Although non-linear 
estimators are now generally available, CES functions are complicated.  We therefore linearly 
estimated equation (1) for specific γ’s, and then conducted a grid search to produce both a 
maximum likelihood estimate for γ and the maximum likelihood function as well.  The 
estimated function is: 
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ND is the fraction of people affected by natural disasters, Y is per capita income, U is 
uncertainty avoidance, and T is tertiary enrolment.   
 
Equation (1) suggests strongly that richer countries are less vulnerable, as are cultures that 
avoid uncertainty.  All else being equal, a greater number of people with tertiary education 
increases vulnerability.  The correlation between per capita income and tertiary education is 
strongly positive, or course.
1  This acts to temper, but not reverse, the positive income effect.  
At the average income ($6848) and the average tertiary enrolment (19%), the positive effect 
of income is 80% lower than suggested by the income parameter alone. 
 
The estimated value of γ is 0.90, with a standard deviation of 0.05.
2  That is, substitution is 
difficult but not impossible.  The weakest link hypothesis holds, but only in a weak sense that 
approximates a variant of the “Cobb-Douglas” structure employed by Brenkert and Malone 
(2005).  Unlike the geometric mean that they employed, however, the proximate Cobb-
Douglas form for equation (3) would not all be equal.  Some degree of substitution across 
determinants is not surprising, since the indicators chosen are proxies rather than “actual 
inputs into the production of safety from natural disasters”. 
 
5.2. Infant  mortality 
 
The same procedure was followed for infant mortality. A number of institutional variables 
had a significant effect on infant mortality: civil liberty (positive)
3, democracy (positive), 
economic freedom (negative), and political stability (positive).  From the religion variables, 
only Christianity had a significant, positive influence.  Individualism and long-term 
orientation were the only significant cultural variables, both with a positive effect.  Secondary 
education and literacy had significant, positive effects on infant mortality.  Absolute poverty, 
average per capita income, and the Gini coefficient had significant, positive effects on infant 
mortality. 
 
When all significant (by group) variables were combined, only absolute poverty, per capita 
income and literacy remain.  The estimated equation is 
                                                 
1 The estimated relationship is 
2
(1.41) (0.00014) 5.20 0.00227 ; 0.67; 122 cc TY R N =+ = = 
2 The boundaries of the 95% confidence interval are taken as the parameter values for which 
the loglikelihood is 2 points below its maximum value. The standard deviation is one-quarter 
of the length of the 95% confidence interval. 
3 Note that we use “positive” and “negative” in the intuitive sense: Civil liberty reduces infant 
mortality.  
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where Y is per capita income, L is literacy, and P is absolute poverty.  A modest version of the 
weakest link hypothesis is again somewhat supported, but none of the indicators is essential. 
 
5.3. Life  expectancy 
 
We followed the same procedure for life expectancy.  Democracy and the rule of law 
positively affected life expectancy, as did Christianity.  High incomes and low fractions of 
people in absolute poverty had positive effects on longevity, but so did an unequal income 
distribution.  A greater degree of trust, more individualism, and a larger aversion to 
uncertainty positively affected life expectancy, as did a higher literacy and a greater 
enrolment in secondary and tertiary education. 
 
Combining all significant variables, democracy, the Gini coefficient, absolute poverty, and 
literacy remained.  The estimated equation is 
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where G is the Gini coefficient, D is democracy (shifted to lie between 1 and 11), L is literacy, 
and P is absolute poverty.  The estimated γ is negative, but it is not statistically significantly 
different from zero.  Recall, though, that life expectancy is not an indicator of vulnerability; it 




Following the same procedure in investigating vulnerability through nutritional levels, 
democracy and the rule of law were the only significant institutional indicators; both had a 
positive effect.  Christianity and Islam affected nutrition positively, whereas the Yoruba 
religion had a negative effect.  Both the average per capita income and the level of absolute 
poverty had a significant effect on nutrition with the expected signs.  Cultures that are 
individualistic and avoid uncertainty had higher nutrition, as did countries with higher 
enrolments in secondary and tertiary education. 
 
Grouping all of these variables, only individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and absolute 
poverty remain.  The estimated relationship is: 
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 where I is individualism, U is uncertainty avoidance, and P is absolute poverty.  The equation 




Again, the same procedure was followed.  The rule of law had a positive, significant effect on 
sanitation.  Sanitation was higher in Christian and Moslem countries.  A higher average 
income and less absolute poverty increased sanitation, but a higher income inequality had the 
same effect.  Sanitation was higher in cultures that are individualistic and avoid uncertainty.  
Literacy and enrolment in secondary and tertiary education all increased sanitation. 
 
Combined, literacy, uncertainty avoidance, and Islam remain.  The estimated relationship is: 
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where I is Islam, U is uncertainty avoidance, and L is literacy.  The functional form is not 
significantly different from linear.  Especially given that the estimate for γ is statistically 
insignificant, the data do not support the weakest link hypothesis. 
 
5.6.  Drinking water treatment 
 
Still following the same procedure, we found that democracy and the rule of law had a 
positive effect on the spread of drinking water treatment.  It was also greater in Christian 
countries, countries with higher average incomes, more equal income distribution, and less 
absolute poverty also improved water treatment.  Uncertainty avoidance and individualism 
had a positive effect, as did literacy and enrolment in secondary education. 
 
Combined, secondary education, income distribution, and absolute poverty remained.  The 
estimated relationship is:  
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where P is absolute poverty, G is the Gini coefficient, and S is secondary education.  Once 
again, linearity cannot be rejected given the insignificant estimate for γ, but the data rather 
give weak support to the weakest link hypothesis. 
 
 
6. Discussion  and  conclusion 
 
We estimated a functional form that allowed a wide range of possibilities about the way in the 
relative strengths of some underlying determinants of adaptive capacity may or may not be 
able to compensate for weakness in others.  Indeed, both extremes, from perfect complements 
consistent with a strict interpretation of the “weakest link” hypothesis to perfect substitutes 
consistent with maximal and perfect compensation, to the “strongest link” in which one 
underlying indicators determines adaptive capacity largely by itself.  
We investigate six cases.  For vulnerability to natural disasters, infant mortality and drinking 
water treatment, we find qualified support for the weakest link hypothesis: the weakest 
indicator plays an important role, but it is not essential.  For life expectancy, sanitation and 
nutrition, we find a relationship that is close to linear so that the various determinants of 
adaptive capacity potentially compensate each other (within the range of experience).  
Although some of best estimates of γ are negative, none is negative and significantly different 
from zero.  We therefore find no empirical support for the strongest link hypothesis, in which 
one single determinant dominates. 
 
It would have been surprising to find stronger evidence for the “weakest link” hypothesis.  
Our indicators of vulnerability and invulnerability are proxies only, and the same holds for 
our indicators of adaptive capacity.  Although the weakest link hypothesis may well hold for 
specific hazards at micro-level, things get blurred for general hazards at macro-level. 
 
The list of potentially significant determinants of adaptive capacity include economic, social, 
political and cultural traits: the fraction of people in absolute poverty, the average per capita 
income, income distribution, literacy, enrolment in secondary and tertiary education, 
democracy, religion, individualism, uncertainty avoidance.  Just as telling, 24 of our initial list 
of 34 potential determinants did not have a significant effect on our alternative measures of 
vulnerability.  The statistically significant determinants of adaptive capacity are different for 
the different measures of vulnerability, which shows that there is no such thing as a general 
adaptive capacity.  Rather, the factors from which systems draw to create adaptive capacity is 
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Table 1: Illustrative cases for underlying strengths of five determinants of adaptive 
capacity. 
  
  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
Case 1  1 1 1 1 1 
Case 2  0.9 0.95  1 1.05  1.1 
Case 3  0.8 0.9  1 1.1 1.2 
Case 4  0.7 0.85  1 1.15  1.3 
Case 5  0.6 0.8  1 1.2 1.4 
Case 6  0.5 0.75  1 1.25  1.5 
Case 7  0.4 0.7  1 1.3 1.6 
Case 8  0.3 0.65  1 1.35  1.7 
Case 9  0.2 0.6  1 1.4 1.8 
Case 10  0.1 0.55  1 1.45  1.9 
Case 11  0.02 0.51  1 1.49 1.98 
 
 
Table 2: Corresponding estimates of vulnerability for various values of γ. 
 
    Gamma      
  0.5 0.9  1  1.1 1.5  2  3 
Case 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Case 2  1.0012545 1.0022616 1.0025138 1.0027662  1.003777 1.0050429  1.007579 
Case 3  1.0050734 1.0091902 1.0102264 1.0112652 1.0154432 1.0207071 1.0313058 
Case 4  1.0116323 1.0212477 1.0236898 1.0261459 1.0360975 1.0487676 1.0745007 
Case 5  1.0212591 1.0393237 1.0439745 1.0486755 1.0679377 1.0928571 1.1441089 
Case 6  1.0345035 1.0649828 1.0729846 1.0811318 1.1150675  1.16 1.2539715 
Case 7  1.052284 1.1010236 1.1141809 1.1277192 1.1854832 1.2645604 1.4333986 
Case 8  1.0762246 1.1528946 1.1744554  1.196995 1.2967366 1.4401542 1.7534362 
Case 9  1.1095899 1.2331604 1.2702337 1.3100096 1.4969878 1.7873016 2.4329662 
Case 10  1.1609859 1.3830885 1.4584889 1.5437474 1.9974782 2.8068306 4.5838503 
Case 11  1.2437577 1.7700063 2.0151606 2.3383737 4.8410991 10.827395 22.385487 
 Table 3. 
Indicator Description  Source 
Institutions    
   Accountability  Political, civil and human rights Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
   Autocracy  Institutionalised autocracy  Marshall and Jaggers (2003) 
   Civil liberties  Freedom of expression, 
assembly, association, 
education and religion 
Freedom House (2003) 
   Executive competition  Extent to which executives are 
chosen through competitive 
elections 
Marshall and Jaggers (2003) 
   Corruption  Petty and grand corruption, and 
state capture 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
   Democracy  Institutionalised democracy  Marshall and Jaggers (2003) 
   Economic freedom  Corruption, barriers to trade, 
fiscal burden, regulatory burden 
(health, safety, environment, 
banking, labour) 
Heritage Foundation (2003) 
   Government effectiveness  Competence of bureaucracy and 
quality of public service 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
   Government quality  Quality of public institutions  Gallup and Sachs (1999) 
   Rule of law  Contract enforcement, quality 
of policy and judiciary, and 
crime 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
   Political rights  Free and fair elections, 
competitive politics, opposition 
power, minority protection 
Freedom House (2003) 
   Executive recruitment  Institutionalised procedure for 
the transfer of executive power 
Marshall and Jaggers (2003) 
   Extent of regulation  Incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
   Political stability  Violent threats or changes in 
government 
Kaufmann et al. (1999) 
Religion    
   Buddhism  Predominantly Buddhist  Adherents.com (2003) 
   Christianity  Predominantly Christian  Adherents.com (2003) 
   Hinduism  Predominantly Hindu  Adherents.com (2003) 
   Islam  Predominantly Moslem  Adherents.com (2003) 
   Yorubaism  Predominantly Yoruba  Adherents.com (2003) 
   Animalism and spiritism  Predominantly Animist  Adherents.com (2003) 
Culture    
   Individualism  Reinforcement of individual 
achievement and interpersonal 
relationships 
Hofstede (2001) 
   Masculinity  Degree of gender differentiation 
and male dominance 
Hofstede (2001) 
   Uncertainty avoidance  Tolerance of uncertainty and 
ambiguity 
Hofstede (2001) 
   Power distance  Degree of inequality in power 
and wealth 
Hofstede (2001)    Long-term orientation  Degree of orientation on the 
future 
Hofstede (2001) 
   Trust  Degree of trust of others  WVS (2003) 
Economics    
   Gini coefficient  Degree of income inequality  WRI (2005) 
   Absolute poverty  Percentage of population living 
on less than $1/day 
WRI (2005) 
   Relative poverty  Percentage of population below 
national poverty line 
WRI (2005) 
   Per capita income  Per capita GDP, purchasing 
power parity exchange rate 
WRI (2005) 
Education    
   Primary  Total enrolment relative to 
school-age population, primary 
education 
WRI (2005) 
   Secondary  Total enrolment relative to 
school-age population, primary 
education 
WRI (2005) 
   Tertiary  Total enrolment relative to 
school-age population, primary 
education 
WRI (2005) 
   Literacy  Percentage of the population 
over 15 able to read and write 
WRI (2005) 
 






















































 Figure 3: “Iso-vulnerability loci for various values of γ with A1
T = A2
T = 0.1.  
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
01234
A1
A
2
A2 (γ=0.5)
A2 (γ=0.9)
A2 (γ=1.1)
 